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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1953 TERM
The position of the majority clearly indicates that when such
machines are used, together with advertising, to vend insurance,
a jury is justified in resolving conflicting inferences in favor of
the claimant.
Contract of Indemnity
In Madawick Contracting Co. v. Travelers Ins.. Co.,8 the insured was a sub-contractor who, in a contract with the general contractor, guaranteed to indemnify him should any liability for injury to property arise as a result of performance by the subcontractor. The contract required the sub-contractor to secure
adequate liability insurance of various types, and provided that
any dispute arising under the contract was to be settled by arbitration.
The subcontractor had previously secured insurance coverage
with defendant insurer, but the policy bore no reference to contractual indemnification. An agent of the insurer read the contract and subsequently the insurer appended an indorsement to
the policy, including by specific reference the contractual indemnity in question.
During the course of construction an injury to property
occurred and the general contractor invoked his right to indemnity
under the contract. The insured immediately notified the insurer
and demanded that it defend in accordance with the terms of the
policy, which provided that the insurer would defend any "suit"
in the insured's name, and would indemnify the insured for
amounts determined"... by judgment against the insured after
actual trial . . ."
The insurer refused to defend on the ground that the policy
in its terms applied only to a "suit" and not to arbitration, and
also contended that it would not be liable to indemnify the insured
for any award emanating from arbitration, since it could be bound
only by a "judgment" after "actual trial."
The insured sued for a declaratory judgment. The Court of
Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division9 and reinstating the
Special Term judgment, 10 held that the terms of the policy must
be construed together with the contract to which it referred, and
concluded that the words "trial" and "Ijudgment"I were sufficiently
broad to encompass arbitration proceedings and an award arising
therefrom.
8. 307 N.Y. 111, 120 N.E. 2d 520 (1954).
9. 281 App. Div. 754, 118 N.Y. S. 2d 115 (2d Dep't 1953).
10. 202 Misc. 411, 114 N. Y. S. 2d 300 (Sup. Ct 1952).
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This result is in harmony with the general principle, long
recognized by the courts, that a "trial" of a factual dispute
merely connotes a competent tribunal examining and determining
and therefore, may include
issues of fact in accordance with law,"
tribunals other than the courts.' 2 Arbitration, though informal,
ranks as a trial.13 Indeed, arbitration proceedings have received4
specific statutory sanction as a means of settling controversies.
Particularly justifiable is the instant decision when reference
is made to the established rule emanating from the law of contracts, that ambiguities in an insurance policy should be resolved
against the insurer, who drew the policy.15 Here the insurer had
undertaken specifically to indemnify the insured for any liability
which might accrue to him under the basic contract with the general contractor. Specific reference to that contract was appended
to the policy. The contract provided for arbitration as an exclusive remedy, unless waived by the adverse party. Under the
circumstances, if the insurer had prevailed, the coverage provided by the policy would have proved illusory.
Notice of Accident
Under an automobile liability insurance policy making "written notice" of an accident "as soon as practicable" a condition
precedent to liability, the notice given must conform to the requirements of the policy,, concluded the Court of Appeals in Bazar v.
Great American Indemnity Co.16 Notice of an accident was not
given to the insurer until some twenty months after its occurrence. The manner of giving notice was as unusual as its tardiness: an agent-of the insurer happened to be present when the insured's husband was accused by a police officer of having been
involved in the accident.
The insured claimed that she had given notice "as soon as
practicable" since she learned of the accident in the same way and
at the same time as did the insurer's agent. No denial was made
11. Ward v. Davis, 6 How. Prac. 274 (1851); People v. Richettli, 302 N. Y. 290,
97 N.E. 2d 908 (1951).
12. Cf., People ex rel. Hunter Arms Co. v. Foster, 247 App. Div. 619, 288 N.Y.
Supp. 295 (4th Dep't 1936) ; People ex rel Myers v. Barnes, 114 N.Y. 317, 20 N.E.
609 (1889) ; Roge v. Valentine, 280 N. Y. 268, 20 N. E. 2d 751 (1939) ; Davis v. Sayer,
205 App. Div. 562, 200 N.Y. Supp. 134 (2d Dep't 1923); People ex rel. Garrilty v.
Walsh, 181 App. Div. 118, 168 N.Y. Supp. 440 (2d Dep't 1917); Plunkett v. Wilson,
179 Misc. 149, 37 N. Y. S. 2d 959 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
13. Hyman v. Pottberg'sEx'rs., 101 F. 2d 262 (2d Cir. 1939).
14. C. P. A. §§ 1448, 1459. Under C.P.A. §§ 1464, 1466, a judgment may be entered on the award, and is enforceable as a judgment in an action.
15. 3 WILLISTON, CONTAC'rs § 621 (Rev. Ed. 1938); 1 COUCH, INSURANCE LAW
§188 (1929).
16. 306 N.Y. 481, 119 N.E. 2d 346 (1954).

